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Separated from his product, man himself produces all the details of his world with ever 
increasing power, and thus finds himself ever more separated from his world. The more 
his life is now his product, the more he is separated from his life. 
 —Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle 
 
The development of large-scale industry expresses itself, finally, in the extrusion of 
workers from the factory—deindustrialisation. Beyond the factory gates, workers find 
themselves wandering in an immense infrastructure, that of modern life, which reflects 
back to them not their growing power, but rather, their impotence. They see not a world 
of their making, but rather a runaway world, a world beyond their control, perhaps 
beyond anyone’s control. 
 —Endnotes, “A History of Separation” 
 
Ashley McKenzie’s bleak and beautiful film Werewolf (2016) would appear to tell a story about 
opioid addiction.
1
 The film’s protagonists, Vanessa (Bhreagh MacNeil) and Blaise (Andrew 
Gillis), are both recovering addicts on a methadone treatment program, frequenting pharmacies 
for their medicine and conversing with government bureaucrats and clinic doctors about their 
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 progress and mental health. And yet McKenzie’s feature debut avoids the tragic excess of 
conventional junkie movies. As she says in an interview, “I talked to different people in the 
methadone program, but I’m not trying to make some sort of exposé.”2 There are no thrilling 
scenes of the characters getting high, stealing, or performing sex work, as one might typically 
expect to find in a film about drug addiction. In fact, Werewolf is hardly a story at all, at least not 
in the generic sense of a conventionally defined narrative arc. And while the departure from 
linear narrative has long been an avant-garde mainstay, the film’s recursive structure and oblique 
close-ups suggest a suffocating constriction instead of some sense of freedom from the dictates 
of a commercial film industry that we might associate with earlier avant-garde cinema like the 
French nouvelle vague. This is because Werewolf, as I hope to show, is first and foremost a 
cinematic meditation on precarity as a social experience of economic stagnation, one that attends 
to the gendered forms precarity assumes in an era of deindustrialization. 
 Werewolf dwells in the everyday reality of recovery and its banal routines, but the opioid 
epidemic—which has spread throughout both rural and deindustrialized regions across North 
America—appears in the film not as the primary cause of the characters’ suffering, but as just 
another symptom of their precarity. Viewers might be forgiven for not recognizing the film’s 
setting in present-day Cape Breton, an island in the Atlantic Canadian province of Nova Scotia 
that was once a hub of industrial activity. While Cape Breton Island has come to be known for its 
natural beauty through the promotional work of its tourism industry in an attempt to fill the 
considerable gap left by the flight of manufacture and extractive trades, Werewolf captures the 
hardscrabble existence of life in the postindustrial region in its depiction of two homeless addicts 
scraping by with a rusty lawnmower in the former mining town of New Waterford. United in 
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 their isolation, Blaise and Nessa (as she’s known) seem to have little left to do but wander the 
blasted wastelands of capitalist ruin, mowing lawns and killing time between methadone doses, 
until the tensions of the couple-form push them apart. Drawing out the consequences of 
economic stagnation for the aesthetics of cinematic realism, this essay explores the relationships 
between precarity and deindustrialization in McKenzie’s film through a Marxian account of the 
figure of separation. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 In the conclusion to Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Fredric 
Jameson writes: “Marx’s fundamental figure for social development and dynamics (a figure that 
runs through the Grundrisse, connecting the 1844 manuscripts in an unbroken line to Capital 
itself) . . . is the fundamental notion of separation (as when Marx describes the production of the 
proletariat in terms of their separation from the means of production—i.e., enclosure, the 
exclusion of the peasants from their land). There has not yet, I think, been a Marxism based on 
this particular figure.”3 Jameson refers here to the process of proletarianization whereby the 
peasantry become formally “free” to sell their labor through their forcible release from serfdom. 
Marx describes this state of affairs as the “separation of labour, capital and landed property” in 
the 1844 manuscripts, and as “the separation of free labour from the objective conditions of its 
realization” in the Grundrisse, and argues in Capital that such separation “is clearly the result of 
a past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a 
whole series of older formations of social production.”4 This process of separation, then—that 
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 which deprives workers of the means of subsistence and renders them dependent on wage labor 
for their survival—establishes the historical specificity of the modern proletariat and constitutes 
its functional distinction from that of earlier exploited classes. From this, everything follows. The 
drive to extract ever more surplus value from the labor process spurs the development of the 
productive forces and a rising demand for labor, leading to a growing concentration of workers, 
increased productive capacity, and rising output rates. But at certain point in the historical 
unfolding of capitalist social development this dynamic shifts, and workers are expelled from the 
production process en masse while productivity tapers off and output declines. The outcome of 
these developments is the total realization of the separated society. 
 Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle stands as a conspicuous exception to the general 
absence in Marxist theory of a sustained investigation into the figure of separation that Jameson 
identifies. According to Debord, “Separation is the alpha and the omega of the spectacle.”5 The 
spectacle reduces lived experience to mere representation, isolating individuals only to reunite 
them through the mediation of images. While Society of the Spectacle might appear to depart 
from Marx’s understanding of separation, Debord in fact posits the dominance of spectacle in 
terms of a lost unity that follows from the universal realization of the capitalist class relation.
6
 In 
the opening chapter, “Separation Perfected,” Debord writes, “The success of the economic 
system of separation is the proletarianization of the world.”7 Modern industrialization rendered 
increasing numbers of people dependent on the wage, but it also enabled the mass accumulation 
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 of capital, such that society in the postwar period confronted existence as a matter not of scarcity 
but abundance. Although Debord was critical of traditional Marxism’s affirmation of labor, he 
nevertheless saw the seeds of a new society in the productive capacity of factory machinery and 
the growing power of the working class.
8
 What he could not have foreseen was that “the 
extension of capitalist social relations gave birth not to the collective worker, but rather to the 
separated society.”9 This latter point forms the crux of the essay “A History of Separation” by 
the Endnotes discussion group, which situates the rise and fall of the workers’ movement against 
the backdrop of the development of the productive forces and the long transition to full 
proletarianization over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the Endnotes group 
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 acknowledges Debord’s contribution to a theory of capitalist separation, their approach takes as 
its point of departure the declining demand for labor after 1973.
10
 
 Most Marxian accounts of this moment of transition tell a story of capitalist expansion 
from the factory into previously separate or semi-autonomous spheres of social life, referencing 
the shift to a post-Fordist mode of production, the financialization of everyday life, or the closure 
of the world market through neoliberal globalization.
11
 But as Robert Brenner notes, “Between 
1973 and the present, economic performance in the US, Western Europe, and Japan has, by 
every standard macroeconomic indicator, deteriorated, business cycle by business cycle, decade 
by decade.”12 Following Brenner, this essay proposes that the present moment in the capitalist 
core is defined by pervasive economic decline, or what is known in macroeconomic theory as 
secular stagnation, a term economists use to refer to the persistence of negligible growth rates 
beyond normal cycles. A decade after the Great Recession, mainstream economists such as 
Lawrence Summers and Robert Gordon have begun to argue that the era of economic growth is 
over. In their search for a model adequate to this new reality, they have turned to the concept of 
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 secular stagnation.
13
 The economist Alvin Hansen, a student of John Maynard Keynes who broke 
with the teachings of his mentor, originally proposed the macroeconomic theory of secular (or 
long-term) stagnation during the Great Depression to account for persistent negligible economic 
growth.
14
 In Hansen’s view, the world economy was at risk of slipping into a permanent state of 
low growth and high unemployment in which any attempt at recovery would prove futile. 
Largely forgotten during the postwar boom, economists have recently revived this 
“macroeconomic heresy” to explain the unusually weak performance of the American economy 
since the 2008 financial crisis.
15
 In order to adequately grasp the contours of the crisis-ridden 
present, however, we have to reach a little further back than 2008, to the crisis of 1973 and its 
aftermath.
16
 
 In what follows, I outline two leading theories of this pivotal shift in 1973—Brenner’s 
account of the long downturn and Arrighi’s model of hegemonic cycles—and the subsequent 
period of economic stagnation and hegemonic unraveling, drawing on the Marxian critique of 
value to distinguish the present downturn from previous periods of hegemonic transition. I then 
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 To be clear, precarity and separation have always been fundamental features of capitalism. The 
distinction I wish to draw here is between an expansive form of capitalism able to integrate vast 
populations into its system of accumulation, and one that, since 1973, has been forced to expel 
increasing numbers of people due to dwindling rates of accumulation and growth. 
 turn to discuss Werewolf, tracing the logic of separation through the film’s engagement with 
deindustrialization, precarity, and gender. Although popular cinema can be thought of as a 
spectacular commodity, Werewolf distinguishes itself from spectacle by virtue of its status as an 
experimental film. When thinking about the temporality of spectacle, Debord certainly had in 
mind the mass culture of a popular cinema and its “pseudo-cyclical” movement between labor-
time and leisure-time.
17
 Yet in an era in which the distinction between work and non-work has 
all but disappeared, avant-garde cinema has deliberately refashioned the temporal rhythms of 
filmic representation in order to critique not only the commodified images of the modern culture 
industry, but also the fantasies of historical continuity and reproductive futurity that underpin 
narrative representation as such. Cinema is never merely spectacle, but is always also an 
aesthetic form, and at its best it participates in experiments in sensorial perception that open a 
window onto the obscured structures propping up the surfaces of reality. For Nicolas Bourriaud, 
“realist describes works that lift the ideological veils which apparatuses of power drape over the 
mechanism of expulsion and its refuse.”18 Werewolf is a case in point, depicting a kind of 
fractured present in which the impasse generated by a stagnant economy is at once social, 
historical, political, and narratological. Instead of offering ways out of our perpetual present, 
however, Werewolf ruminates on the experience of being “stuck” so as to better understand what 
binds us to the contemporary moment. In doing so, McKenzie’s film offers a poignant example 
of what I call the aesthetics of stagnation. 
 
The Onset of Stagnation 
 
                                                 
17
 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, §151. 
18
 Nicolas Bourriaud, The Exform, trans. Erik Butler (New York: Verso, 2016), x. 
 The 1973 recession marked the decisive point at which an already sputtering global economy 
abruptly lurched into a process of large-scale restructuring. This shift signaled the beginning of 
the end for American hegemony and its organization of the capitalist world-system, ushering in a 
protracted period of economic stagnation and contraction in the West. For Brenner, this moment 
witnessed the “transition from long boom to long downturn.”19 In the wake of the 1973 oil shock 
and the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1973 (and following the Nixon Shock of 
1971), the 1973 stock market crash made evident at the economic level what the Fall of Saigon 
in 1975 would subsequently demonstrate at the level of geopolitics: the postwar economic order 
was unraveling, and the American century was in a profound state of crisis. After World War II, 
the leading capitalist economies enjoyed what Giovanni Arrighi describes as “a worldwide 
virtuous circle of high profits, high investments and increasing productivity.”20 But as Brenner 
argues, between 1965 and 1973, as output rates in Germany and Japan caught up with those of 
the US, what had been previously “a symbiosis, if a highly conflictual and unstable one, of 
leader and followers, of early and later developers, and of hegemon and hegemonized” became a 
zero-sum game of cutthroat competition.
21
 Global profit rates plummeted. The response of the 
governments and industry leaders of the advanced capitalist countries to the steep fall in 
profitability across major sectors of the economy only exacerbated the crisis, plunging the global 
economy into extended decline. 
 In Arrighi’s account of this decline in American hegemony, he turns to Fernand 
Braudel’s theory of the “long century” to model what he calls “systemic cycles of 
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 accumulation.”22 He identifies four cycles, each tied geopolitically to a global hegemon, and 
each divided into three phases held in sway, in turn, by the logics of mercantile, industrial, and 
financial capital. Pinpointing 1973 as the signal crisis of the US cycle of accumulation, Arrighi 
argues that the financialization of the capitalist world-system in the post-1973 period reflects a 
recurrent pattern that spans the longue durée of capital accumulation, marking the collapse of the 
Italian, Dutch, and British financial empires in previous “long centuries.” For Arrighi, 
deindustrialization and financialization are two sides of the same coin: “When escalating 
competition reduces the availability of relatively empty, profitable niches in the commodity 
markets, the leading capitalist organizations have one last refuge, to which they can retreat and 
shift competitive pressures onto others. This final refuge is the money market.”23 And in the 
post-1973 period, to be sure, staggering profits have accrued in the US-centered financial sector, 
while profit rates in manufacture have suffered a dramatic decline.
24
 In Arrighi’s model, this 
financial bubble cannot rescue an ailing hegemon, which at the end of each cycle must inevitably 
give way to its successor. In Braudel’s seasonal formulation, “it [is] a sign of autumn.”25 What 
distinguishes the present moment of American decline, I contend, is that there appears to be no 
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 new cycle of accumulation on the horizon, no ascending hegemon that might inaugurate a 
renewed expansion of the capitalist economy on a global scale.
26
  
 In their focus on inter-capitalist competition, the analyses offered by Brenner and 
Arrighi—as illuminating as they are in tracing the contours of the post-World War II period—
operate at the level of price, and therefore cannot fully account for the historical specificity of the 
current conjuncture, which is marked fundamentally by a crisis of value.
27
 “Competition 
executes the inner laws of capital,” Marx writes, “but it does not invent them. It realizes them.”28 
Here, Marx suggests we can discern, in the motion of intercapitalist competition, a trace of the 
operations of capital’s secular tendencies. But the underlying process driving this motion—what 
Marx calls valorization—remains, in the final instance, obscured. Marx’s critique of value offers 
three distinct moments of insight into the arc of accumulation. First, the capitalist form of value, 
as an actually existing abstraction, form-determines the labor process and its reproduction at the 
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 level of the social whole.
29
 Next, in its drive to self-expansion, capital reorganizes the labor 
process to increase productivity via technological ratcheting.
30
 Finally, through the 
rationalization of the labor process, capital erodes the very source of value, expelling increasing 
numbers of workers from the production process and thereby slipping inexorably into crisis. 
When capital reaches this level of density, the affirmation of labor—the traditional Marxist 
project of its liberation and socialization—becomes impossible. Labor cannot represent an 
opposition to capital or be the agent of its overcoming in an era of deindustrialization, not simply 
because it is always already an alienated form of human activity but because it no longer 
occupies a structural position within the class relation from which to assert itself as an 
antagonist. 
 This is the autumnal logic of seasonal torpor for a labor movement in terminal decline. 
As the Endnotes group argues, the development of the productive forces has not concentrated 
workers into a compact mass but separated them from each other: 
 
The mistake of the theorists of the labour movement was as follows. They often described 
capitalist social relations in terms of a foundational fracturing: the separation of peasants 
from the land generated a propertyless proletariat. However, the class relation is not only 
established through a foundational fracturing; it also confirms that fracturing in every 
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 moment. Capitalism realises the fracturing of social existence as the “unity-in-separation” 
of market society, an interdependence of everyone on everyone else, which nevertheless 
reduces individuals to isolated atoms, facing off against one another in market 
competition.
31
 
 
Both Brenner and Arrighi equate the present moment of economic and hegemonic decline with 
the Gilded Age, insofar as the capitalist class also launched an assault on the working classes at 
the end of the nineteenth century.
32
 During the period that marked the transition from British to 
US hegemony, however, the industrial proletariat was expanding in size and increasing in 
concentration—a process of mass integration and expansion that would accelerate over much of 
the twentieth century—whereas in the post-1973 period the proletariat has been defined by 
expulsion and fragmentation. As Aaron Benanav argues, “Since 1973, rising precarity has been 
associated not only with the decline of the welfare state, but also with a slowdown in capital 
accumulation, a rise in unemployment, and a decline in the availability of industrial jobs, all of 
which mark off the present from the Gilded Age past.”33 This distinction helps explain why 
Arrighi’s model has been unable to account for the absence of new cycle of accumulation, but 
also allows for a better account of the post-1973 period, in which the shift from boom to 
downturn that Brenner narrates accompanies a secular decline in capital accumulation and thus a 
falling demand for labor. Rising precarity in the post-1973 period therefore reflects the declining 
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 possibilities for social reproduction through capital accumulation under prevailing conditions of 
secular stagnation. 
 
The Separated Society 
 
The protagonists in Werewolf bear all the hallmarks of precarity: financial insecurity, 
employment scarcity, an inability to plan for the future, a lack of political power, and subjection 
to state negligence. Excluded from a formal economy in the throes of downturn, Blaise and 
Nessa scrape together what little money they can, mowing lawns in order to cover their 
methadone treatments and syphoning gas from parked cars to run a rusty mower on its last legs. 
Shunned by members of a property-owning class who distrust them around their homes, Blaise 
and Nessa are separated not only from the world of gainful employment, but also from the 
everyday life that more financially stable families enjoy, despite the fact that they only want the 
same “peace of mind” and “security” as anyone else, as Blaise says.34 Early in the film they meet 
with a state representative to apply for low-income housing, but are told that there are no 
vacancies and that the waiting list is long. And so they move into an abandoned trailer in the 
woods, dragging the lawnmower up the steep incline of a long gravel road at the end of each day 
(see fig. 1). This isolation figures in the film as an epistemological gap separating them from the 
normative world of capitalist society, which Blaise articulates when he tells a clinic doctor, “You 
don’t understand how a person like me lives.”35 Blaise and Nessa are also, in large part, deprived 
of familial networks of support. Later in the film, when Blaise relapses and a friend asks him if 
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 he needs to call someone, Blaise tells him, “I don’t have anybody to call.”36 And while Nessa has 
an aunt who allows them to stay with her temporarily, Blaise and Nessa are for the most part on 
their own. They have aspirations to escape their situation and move “out west,” presumably to 
the lucrative oil fields of Alberta, but have little capacity for upward mobility.
37
 Besides, Nessa 
cannot transfer her methadone treatment plan out of province until she clears her balance, which 
at over a hundred and fifty dollars is out of reach without a steady income. Such is life for two 
homeless addicts in post-industrial Cape Breton. 
 The stakes of McKenzie’s critical perspective become clearer when we consider the title 
originally proposed for the film, The Train Whistle Does Not Blow. Infamous for having the 
highest rates of unemployment and youth outward-migration in Canada, Cape Breton Island was 
once a booming industrial center during what Arrighi identifies as the British and US cycles of 
accumulation, particularly in mining and steel production.
38
 Indeed, the fate of the Atlantic 
Canadian economy at the end of the twentieth century was inexorably tied to the hegemonic 
cycles of capital accumulation, and followed a global wave of deindustrialization as the capitalist 
world-system underwent a sweeping process of financialization after 1973. In the early twentieth 
century, the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation was the largest employer in Canada. By 
Friday 13
th
, 1967—a day that became known locally as “Black Friday”—Hawker Siddeley 
Canada was struggling to keep afloat and announced it would be closing the Sydney Steel Plant. 
Both the steel and coal industries continued under government ownership for the rest of the 
twentieth century, but by the early 1990s, both industries were in trouble again and were 
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 permanently closed by the end of 2001.
39
 The island also used to be home to a militant labor 
movement that lives on primarily through its memorialization in observances such as Davis Day, 
an annual day of remembrance that commemorates the life of William Davis, a striking miner 
gunned down by police during a rally near New Waterford in 1925.
40
 The final throes of labor 
militancy saw union members chain themselves to VIA Rail train carriages after the Crown 
corporation decided to terminate its rail service to Cape Breton in the 1990s, which labor leaders 
feared would further separate the population from the national economy and sound the death 
knell for industrial employment on the island.
41
  
 Sure enough, not long after the train whistles fell silent, the Cape Breton Development 
Corporation that had taken over the mines in 1968 closed its doors for good following the 
decommissioning of all its mines in 2001, and the company’s former headquarters in Glace Bay 
became a call center.
42
 Service work is now one of the biggest sectors of employment on the 
island. But deindustrialization has not only led to rising unemployment rates and the growth of 
service sector work. Vast numbers of young people from Cape Breton Island now work in and 
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 around the oil sands project in Alberta.
43
 Sydney, the largest city on the island, had a population 
of over 30,000 in the decades following World War II. That number began to drop in the 1970s, 
and by the turn of the new millennium had declined by a third. The setting of the film thus 
exhibits all the signs of rustbelt degradation: economic stagnation, population loss, and urban 
decay. At work here is a kind of “slow death,” a phrase Lauren Berlant, following David Harvey, 
uses to describe “the physical wearing out of a population in a way that points to its deterioration 
as a defining condition of its experience and historical existence.”44 Slow death traverses the 
border between living and dying such that it becomes difficult to distinguish the two, an 
experience that “is simultaneously at an extreme and in a zone of ordinariness, where life 
building and the attrition of human life are indistinguishable.”45  
 Consider the fact that cancer rates in Cape Breton County are significantly higher than 
the national average.
46
 Or that youth are at increased risk of drug addiction. The opioid epidemic 
of “hillbilly heroin” that swept across the island in the early years of the new millennium 
continues to take its toll on communities.
47
 Despite this public health emergency, in 2016 the 
Canadian Federal government cut funding for the only safe needle exchange program on the 
                                                 
43
 For a discussion of labor migration from Cape Breton to the oil sands of Alberta, see Nelson 
Ferguson, “From Coal Pits to Tar Sands: Labour Migration between an Atlantic Canadian 
Region and the Athabasca Oil Sands,” Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society 17 
and 18 (2011): 106-118. 
44
 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 95. 
45
 Ibid., 96. 
46
 Department of Health, “Moving to Address High Cancer Rates in Cape Breton,” Nova Scotia, 
Canada (provincial government website), April 21, 1999, 
https://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=19990421003 
47
 Shawna Richer, “‘Hillbilly Heroin’ Hits Cape Breton,” The Globe and Mail, March 10, 2003, 
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/hillbilly-heroin-hits-cape-
breton/article4127611/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com& 
 island.
48
 The film captures the pervasive slow death of the island, not only through images of 
boarded-up buildings covered with spray paint and washed-out landscapes of overgrown lawns 
and unpaved roads, but also in its representation of a state that keeps addicts alive only to 
manage their deterioration through the methadone treatment program. Blaise and Nessa are the 
leftovers of an industrial proletariat now lacking a material basis upon which to secure its own 
social reproduction. In this sense, the film affirms Bourriaud’s argument that, in order to be 
adequate to the contemporary conjuncture, any realist practice in the present must attend to the 
logics governing the distinctions between productive and unproductive, product and waste, and 
the included and excluded. “Waste,” Bourriaud writes, “refers to what is cast off when 
something is made. The proletariat—the social class that capital has at its full disposal—is no 
longer found only in factories. It runs through the whole of the social body and comprises a 
people of the abandoned.”49 Living on the fringes of a decaying social order, Blaise and Nessa 
mock the convention in cultural production that youth embody reproductive futurity and carry in 
their very presence the promise of a new day. Queer theorist Lee Edelman has argued that kids 
are the representatives of “reproductive futurism,”50 or the ongoing reproduction of the existing 
social order. But Blaise and Nessa have no future. 
 Werewolf paints a picture of a world in which the exhaustion of valorization has passed 
the point of no return and human life has become refuse, or, in Marxian terms, surplus. For 
Marx, “capital itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labour time to a 
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 minimum, while it posits labour time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth. 
Hence it diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous 
form; hence posits the superfluous in growing measure as a condition—question of life or 
death—for the necessary.”51 Marx calls this process “the general law of capital accumulation,” 
which charts the general increase in constant over variable capital as it is coded into the most 
basic movement of capital over time: 
 
The greater social wealth, the functioning of capital, the extent and energy of its growth, 
and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productivity of 
its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army. The same causes which develop the 
expansive power of capital, also develop the labour-power at its disposal. The relative 
mass of industrial reserve army thus increases with the potential energy of wealth. But 
the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labour-army, the greater is the 
mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to the amount 
of torture it has to undergo in the form of labour. The more extensive, finally, the 
pauperized sections of the working class and the industrial reserve army, the greater is 
official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.
52
  
 
Capital works, on the one hand, to create as much available labor power as possible, and, on the 
other, to steadily decrease the amount of socially necessary labor time, producing a surplus 
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 population that tends toward consolidated pauperism.
53
 Through the real subsumption of labor, 
capital reduces the amount of labor time that is socially necessary for production. Decreasing 
socially necessary labor time through real subsumption entails what Marx calls a “rising organic 
composition” of capital, which indexes “the progressive decline in the variable capital in relation 
to the constant capital.”54 In other words, capital accumulation proceeds with more hardware and 
software relative to the number of workers on the job. This process by which labor becomes 
superfluous does not result in the disappearance of work, but instead in its precarization. Again, 
Marx is instructive here: “the higher the productivity of labor, the greater is the pressure of the 
workers on the means of employment, the more precarious therefore becomes the condition for 
their existence.”55 Expelled from production, labor is forced to seek the means of its reproduction 
in the sphere of circulation, greasing the wheels of capital in a bloating service sector.
56
  
 Offering their lawn mowing services on the black market, Blaise and Nessa exemplify the 
precarious workers of an informal economy that has taken on new significance in the era of 
deindustrialization. Mowing lawns is the only work either of them can find for much of the film, 
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 until Nessa manages to get a job selling soft serve at an ice cream parlor. Informal work or 
service work: these are the options on offer in a stagnant economy. The increase of investment in 
fixed capital that Marx argues pushes labor out of the production process does not only result in 
mass unemployment, but also produces a ballooning service sector.
57
 Consider the image of the 
biscuit grinder at the ice cream parlor (see fig. 2). Metallic and rudimentary, the grinder 
resembles a scaled-down piece of machinery from an industrial-era factory, yet it appears as part 
of the minimal fixed capital needed to run a service-based business. What is more, the biscuit 
grinder in the film requires manual rotation, making it seem out of date at the same time that it 
reminds us there is little room for automation in the service sector. Indeed, the service sector by 
definition resists technological innovation and development, which is why it has been the 
primary site for absorbing surplus labor and why it tends toward low productivity and low 
wages. But the explosive growth of service work in the wake of deindustrialization also signals 
the solidification of the separated society. As Endnotes puts it, “Everywhere, the working class is 
less homogeneous—it is stratified across high- and low-income occupations; its work is more 
precarious; and it switches jobs more frequently. More and more workers feel like work has no 
purpose; for more and more are employed in dead-end service jobs, or are unemployed or 
unemployable.”58 The image of the biscuit grinder not only represents capital pulverizing human 
labor. It also operates as a basic heuristic for the capitalist logic of separation as capital 
accumulation itself inevitably tends to grind down: the tendential displacement of industrial labor 
by service work, and the rising precarity that characterizes a post-industrial workforce excluded 
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 from production, “littered across innumerable shops” and spread among “an endless 
differentiation of tasks.”59. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
The Aesthetics of Stagnation 
 
What happens to avant-garde cinema when capital accumulation comes grinding to a halt? While 
a comprehensive account of post-1973 avant-garde cinema remains beyond the scope of this 
essay, it bears mentioning that Werewolf shares certain formal features with other avant-garde 
films of the period, such as Lizzie Borden’s Born in Flames (1983) and Harmony Korine’s 
Gummo (1997).
60
 These films participate in an uptake in avant-garde realist techniques among 
filmmakers since the 1980s that can be understood as part of a turn to realism that accompanies 
periods of hegemony in crisis, following Jed Etsy’s Arrighian argument that “realism wars can 
be mapped onto tectonic shifts in the history of global Anglophone hegemonies in the modern 
world system.”61 Like the “revanchist realism” that Leigh Claire La Berge argues emerged in the 
1980s alongside and against “the canonization of postmodernism as an aesthetic mode” seeking 
to “resuscitate the dominant aesthetic mode that had been used to capture and critique finance 
capital’s early twentieth-century cultural and economy hegemony, from the gilded age to the 
Great Depression,”62 this cinematic realism refuses the fantasy of reproductive futurity that 
capitalist realism espouses. But if finance, as La Berge argues, should be understood as “an 
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 orientation and contestation over futurity,”63 films like Born in Flames and Gummo participate in 
this contest only to the extent that they reject the conventions of narrative temporality. 
Confronting the impasse of capitalist crisis, Born in Flames exhibits a preoccupation with space 
and place that results from the exhaustion of a developmental narrative arc. In a similar focus on 
space and place, Gummo ties structural unemployment to generalized decay in the former 
bastions of industrialism at the end of the long boom. Spatialized narratives, surplus populations, 
social decay: these are the characteristics of cinematic realism in an age of value in crisis. 
Whereas finance promises a future of pure speculation, this avant-garde cinematic realism is one 
in which the future has been cancelled. This is an example of what I am calling the aesthetics of 
stagnation, which increasingly defines—but is in no way exclusive to—contemporary avant-
garde cinema.  
 Encoding the logics and affects of stagnation at the level of aesthetic form, Werewolf 
suggests that contemporary forms of precarity in the deindustrialized West are tied to a crisis of 
reproductive futurity that follows from the persistence of economic decline. Minimalist dialogue, 
an often stationary camera, scenes shot at close vantage: life in the diegetic world of the film has 
been pared down. Shot almost entirely in close-ups, the camera restricts the viewer’s perception 
to the claustrophobic universe of the two leads. Generating a mood of apprehension that 
stubbornly lingers without ever amounting to any sort of rupture, Werewolf favors an affective 
space somewhere between reservation and suffocating constriction. The film opens with a shot of 
a piece of old fishing rope, affixed as a clothesline between a tree and a rusted-out trailer, and 
with the sounds of birds chirping. The rope sits taut for a moment before it is pulled in by the 
shaking hands of a young junkie wearing a hospital bracelet, who we will later learn is Blaise. In 
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 the next shot, the camera cuts to a pair of bare feet gently swaying in the breeze, the rope 
creaking. Opening with Blaise’s suicide, Werewolf offers no way forward—his fate is sealed 
from the beginning. At the end of the film, we return to the opening moment, the timeline of 
events having caught up with its inevitable outcome. The film affirms this recursive narrative 
structure in the cyclical regularity of the methadone treatment program, producing an 
overwhelming sensation of inescapable misery. While such a cyclical narrative arc might 
otherwise suggest a form of liberation from the strictures of cinematic tradition, in this case the 
weight of history bears down on the form, a consequence of the foreclosure that the grinding-
down of capital accumulation portends. That is, the departure from linearity signals the 
exhaustion of a progressively developing modernity and its accompanying narrative telos, 
recasting confinement in terms of an impasse in historical time. In other words, Blaise was 
always already dead. 
 The film’s realism might thus be understood as a contemporary variant of what was 
known in the mid-twentieth century as “kitchen-sink realism” or “kitchen-sink drama,” updated 
for the era of deindustrialization. Kitchen-sink realism was part of the British New Wave, a 
cultural movement that emerged in the early postwar years in the United Kingdom alongside the 
more renowned nouvelle vague in France, which centered on the domestic life of working-class 
Britons. The moniker derives from an expressionist painting of a kitchen sink by John Bratby, an 
artist whose work took everyday objects like trash cans and toilets as its subject matter.
64
 As a 
term, kitchen-sink realism was used by critics to describe theater, visual art, literature, television, 
and film that portrayed “angry young men” disillusioned with modern society in the harsh style 
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 of social realism.
65
 Typically set in industrial areas of Northern England, kitchen-sink realism 
regularly featured shots of cramped rentals and grimy pubs, and addressed social and political 
issues of the day such as homelessness and racism. Although the legacy of kitchen-sink realism 
survives in the UK in the films of Mike Leigh and Ken Loach, it tends to find its popular 
expression in British soap operas like Coronation Street and EastEnders.
66
 But McKenzie’s indie 
film also shares many of the conventions of the genre: a realist representation of individuals from 
the poorer classes and their everyday lives, disaffected protagonists at odds with the modern 
world, and a keen awareness of the pressing social and political issues at stake in contemporary 
society. Rather than concentrate on the everyday lives of an industrial working class, however, 
Werewolf brings the genre up to date, to wallow in the dregs of unemployment that punctuate a 
post-industrial landscape. But the film distinguishes itself, as well, in its choice of protagonists. 
Instead of primarily focusing on men, Werewolf examines the gender politics of the couple form 
in an age of deindustrialization, emphasizing that it is Nessa who bears the brunt of a shared 
precarity through the feminized work of crisis management. 
 The film pays also particular attention to the way the couple-form becomes a refuge from 
the insecurity and unemployment that mark a stagnant economy, especially for those who lack 
access to familial wealth. Blaise’s machismo, for example—which is expressed in how much 
space he takes up and tracked by his aggression and tendency to dominate the dialogue—can be 
read as a desperate attempt on the part of unemployed men to restore masculinity to its former 
place of privileged access to social security in the “Golden Age” of the Fordist family wage. The 
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 film reproduces this gendered unevenness in the framing of shots in which Blaise fills the screen 
while Nessa stands off to the side or behind him. Despite consistently sidelining Nessa, however, 
Blaise also effectively casts her as his caretaker, manipulating her into enabling his patterns of 
behaviour. In a suggestive scene, he hides in her hair: she is his shield, which is to say he 
instrumentalizes her so as to protect himself from the world (see fig. 3). Although both Blaise 
and Nessa admit to having suicidal thoughts in their meetings with clinic doctors, she feels 
responsible for keeping him alive, while he appears quite happy to use her for his own benefit. 
When their lawnmower breaks down, he even suggests half jokingly that she will “have to suck 
somebody’s dick” in order to pay for their next methadone dosage.67 The film thus implies that 
the couple-form is no refuge at all, but only supports the characters’ mutual decline. It might 
appear that, in order to escape this fate, Nessa must break free of the couple form, and in the end 
she does just that. But even after she leaves Blaise, she still has no real freedom: her job at the 
ice cream parlor merely provides enough money to maintain her methadone treatment program, 
and the final shot of her hunched over at work prefigures her shouldering the burden of his 
suicide. 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
 More might be said about the representation of gendered precarity in Werewolf, but it 
will have to suffice for the moment to conclude with the observation that gender appears in the 
film as yet another instance of separation. While it may have seemed for a time that all non-class 
identities—including gender—would dissolve in the homogenous mass of semi-skilled factory 
workers, deindustrialization has meant that, if anything, the gendered division of labor has 
become even more entrenched. As the Endnotes group writes, “The workers’ movement rested 
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 on a vision of the future that turned out to be a dream. In the second half of the twentieth century 
workers awoke from this dream to discover that all that was supposed to bring them together had 
actually separated them.”68 In the wretched lives of Blaise and Nessa, we see the consequences 
of deindustrialization for a labor movement that staked its claim on the future on the assumption 
that capitalist development creates a society of abundance and necessitates the growth of a 
working class increasing in both strength and number. In this sense, the film is not about class 
politics, but their absence: an image of a proletarian class in the throes of decomposition. 
Werewolf reminds us that anti-capitalist politics today needs to confront the historical distance 
between the working class and the proletariat, a gulf that widens daily as the demand for labor 
continues to decline and the figure of the waged worker recedes from its place on the world 
stage. In the meantime, the millions who live in the separated society will continue to burn out, 
butting up against the barriers of a stagnant economy. 
 
Captions: 
Image 1: Blaise and Nessa drag their rusty lawnmower up a long gravel drive at the end of the 
day. Ashley McKenzie, Werewolf (2016). 
 
Image 2: Blaise hides under Nessa’s hair. Ashley McKenzie, Werewolf (2016). 
 
Image 3: The biscuit grinder in the ice cream parlor. Ashley McKenzie, Werewolf (2016). 
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